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Published: April 2008
Economic theory predicts that asymmetric information can lead to adverse selection in health insurance markets. Fears of adverse selection and risk selection have shaped policy-makers’ behavior around health reforms for decades. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, this new research found both strong evidence of multidimensional private information and advantageous selection in the Medigap market. The authors argue that selection based on risk aversion is advantageous, assuming those who are more risk averse both buy more coverage and have lower risk. The article explores the issue of advantageous selection from several perspectives and examines how it varies by income, education, future expectations and cognitive ability.
This article was sponsored in part by funding from the Economic Research Initiative on the Uninsured (ERIU), a program of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. The article won the 17th Annual Kenneth J. Arrow Award in Health Economics for the best paper in health economics in 2008 from the International Health Economics Association (iHEA).
Aspects of Health Reform: Introduction
By:
McLaughlin C, Levy H and Quinn B
Publication date:
Summer 2009
Summary:
For its last act, the Economic Research Initiative on the Uninsured (ERIU) commissioned four papers to highlight the core economic principles that policy-makers should understand as they grapple with health care reform.
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and the Promise of Health Insurance Reform
By:
Buchmueller TC and Monheit AC
Publication date:
Summer 2009
Summary:
Employee-sponsored insurance (ESI) accounts for over 90 percent of private health insurance in the United States. This article explores how reforms to the broader health care system might affect ESI.
Mandates and the Affordability of Health Care
By:
Glied S
Publication date:
Summer 2009
Summary:
This article examines the "affordability" standard with regard to consumption patterns for health coverage and services. The author explores crucial differences between health care consumption and the consumption of other merit goods (i.e., food and...
Risk Selection and Risk Adjustment: Improving Insurance in the Individual and Small Group Markets
Publication date:
Summer 2009
Summary:
This article describes underlying problems in the markets for small group and individual insurance; appraises current methods of subsidizing insurance for high-risk individuals; and discusses how risk adjustment addresses conflicts between the group and individual...
Beneficial Moral Hazard and the Theory of the Second Best
By:
Frick KD and Chernew ME
Publication date:
Summer 2009
Summary:
Various factors, including the mechanism for setting prices, contribute to distortions and inefficiencies in health insurance markets. This paper reviews analyses of how moral hazard compensates for inefficiencies and increases economic benefits of insurance...